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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KELLY F. PEARSON, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, 
Respondent /Appellant. 
PETE D. THANOS, 
Intervenor/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPELLANTS, Kimberlee Y. Thanos ("Kim") and Pete D. Thanos, ("Pete"), by and 
through counsel, hereby submit the following as their Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF SCHOOLCRAFT. 
A. The Court of Appeals Erred in its Review of the Facts Bearing on 
Standing. 
The Utah Court of Appeals decision squarely conflicts with the controlling policy 
considerations articulated by this Court in In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
("Schoolcraft"). The Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed, in part, due to the 
1 
Lower Court Civil No. 004907881 
Court of Appeals No. 20040677-CA 
Supreme Court No. 20060563-SC 
fact that it erroneously substituted its own findings of fact for the findings of the trial 
court prior to applying the Schoolcraft analysis. Contrary to Appellee's assertion, 
Appellants reliance upon the case of Willey v.Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997), which 
warned against the appellate court substituting its own findings for findings made by the 
trial court, is not misplaced. (Brief of Respondent at 15-16.) This Court, in Schoolcraft, 
concluded that whether an individual has standing to challenge the presumption of 
legitimacy depends not on legal status alone, but on a case-by-case determination. 799 
P.2d at 713. This Court found that the Court of Appeals analysis in Schoolcraft had been 
"too mechanistic and, consequently insufficiently sensitive to the legitimate policy 
consideration Schoolcraft raises." 799 P.2d at 713. 
The determination of standing in cases like this one is not a mechanistic question 
that makes it solely a question of law, as the factual findings directly bear on the question 
of standing. Given the need to be factually sensitive in applying the particular facts to the 
Schoolcraft analysis, the admonitions of Willey are wholly applicable. This court has 
admonished the Court of Appeals that it should only make findings of fact in the most 
extraordinary of circumstances. Willey, 951 P.2d at 235. Those extraordinary 
circumstances do not exist in this case. 
Unlike the cases cited by Appellee, Judge Medley received and considered 
substantial independent factual information from the court-appointed custody evaluator, 
Dr. Jill Sanders. (Brief of Appellants at 10-14.) 
The Court of Appeals was in a inferior a position to examine the evidence, given 
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the heavy reliance upon the vacated October 17, 2001 Order. This court in Willey, 
addressed both the question of whether an appellate court was in an equal position with 
the trial court with respect of the facts at issue and the appropriateness of the Court of 
Appeals rejecting the trial courts findings and accepting other evidence, despite a lack of 
supporting evidence, in modifying the trial judge's award. In that case, this court 
concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in making its own findings and substituting its 
own judgment for that of the trial court. 951 P.2d at 234. 
In considering the facts of this particular case and applying the same to 
Schoolcraft, Judge Medley had substantial factual evidence and extensive reports by Dr. 
Jill Sanders. Despite this, the Court of Appeals rejected Judge Medley's findings and 
adopted the vacated findings of Commissioner Evans. Those erroneous findings were 
absolutely critical to the Court of Appeals' decision. 
Based upon the Court of Appeals inappropriate substitution of its own findings, as 
well as their reliance upon erroneous facts set forth by a commissioner in a vacated Order, 
the Court of Appeals did err in its review of the facts bearing on the issue of standing to 
challenge Zachary's paternity. 
B. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Interpreted the First Prong of the 
Schoolcraft Test Regarding the Policy of Preserving an Intact Marriage 
1. Appellee's "Broad View" of the Policy Goal of Preserving the 
Stability of the Marriage is Not Supported by Schoolcraft 
Appellee asserts that the Court of Appeals has not made a finding that the 
Pearsons' marriage was intact or that Thanos was "at fault" in undermining the Pearsons' 
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marital relationship. (Brief of Respondent at 17.) 
Paragraph 21 of the Court of Appeals' Opinion states, 
The trial court erred in failing to recognize that the Pearsons' 
shared parentage of Z.P. represented a stabilizing force in their 
then-existing marriage, and that the potential of a paternity 
challenge would diminish that stabilizing effect. Thus, even after 
the Pearsons filed for divorce, Thanos' challenge to Z.P.'s paternity 
can be said to have had some undermining effect on the stability of 
the Pearsons' marriage within the meaning of Schoolcraft's public 
policy analysis. 
The Court of Appeals' finding - one not found among those of the trial court - that 
Pete destabilized the marriage, is made in support of its holding that Pete lacked standing 
to intervene in this case. As has been previously argued, such a fault-based analysis is not 
part of the Schoolcraft test. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' finding is inconsistent 
with the trial court's finding that "the ultimate cause of the termination of their [the 
Pearsons'] marriage was their irreconcilable differences." (R. 2463.) 
In effect the Court of Appeals has added a new element to the "intact marriage" 
test: that who seeks to assert rights in a child must prove that he did not interfere with the 
possible reconciliation between the putative father and the mother. 
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, Kim and Kelly's marriage was a 
marriage in name only at the time the challenge to the child's paternity was made by Pete. 
(R. 2533 at 465: 7-11; 452: 9-11; R. 982, f 18; R. 983, f 21.) Kelly Pearson had filed for 
divorce and initially named Pete Thanos as an Intervenor in the pleadings. (R. 2 f 7.) 
Further, the trial court made a specific finding that it was not Pete's fault that the parties 
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got divorced, but a product of irreconcilable differences. (Finding 57(d); R. 2463.) 
Appellee's reliance on S.G. v. A.G. and J.G., 764 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2000) misapprehends the purpose of the quoted text. The statement that "although 
divorce may separate and strain a family with children, divorce does not end the 
important child-rearing functions of the family," is merely a description of the 
continuation of rights post-divorce and post-separation, concerning all children and 
parents in divorce and marital relationships. The quoted language does not address the 
question of standing, but the rights and liberty interests parents have in their children after 
divorce. 
Appellee quoted the following language from In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996): 
[T]he state has a well-recognized interest in preserving and 
protecting the dignity of parental relationships, especially 
where a marriage is being dissolved and instability is being 
introduced into a child's life. 
Id at 448. 
While the State does have an interest in protecting parental relationships, that 
interest must be balanced against the interest of the biological parent. The Schoolcraft 
test requires an analysis of whether there is a stable or intact marriage in order to balance 
that interest. In this case, at the date Pete filed for intervention, the divorce action had 
been commenced by Kelly. (R.2 fl.) Further, Kelly and Kim were divorced on June 7, 
2002 (R. 855-856) which was prior to the date the court granted Pete leave to intervene 
on November 7, 2002. (R. 971- 972.) 
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The Appellee cites to Freeman, but ignores the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Texas, which, in defining the interest a state has in preserving the stability of a marriage 
from outside attacks, stated in In Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994): 
The State has a legitimate interest in minimizing familial disruptions that are 
harmful to the child. But as the court of appeals observed, this marital unit was 
clearly disrupted before Larry [biological father] ever filed this suit: 
[T]hat the biological mother, for whatever reason, has chosen to engage in 
sexual relations outside of marriage is proof itself that the "integrity and 
solemnity of the family unit" has been damaged at least to some degree. 
[Resolution of these difficulties by the husband and wife] does not, we feel 
give license to the state to perpetuate the myth of "presumption of 
paternity'1 so as to deprive the biological father of at least a chance of being 
able to exercise those rightsy duties, privileges, and responsibilities that all 
civilized societies have recognized to be fundamentally ingrained in the 
concept of parenthood. 
Id. at 197 (emphasis added). 
For the J.W.T. court, the fact that mother engaged in illicit affairs outside of the 
marriage was enough to undermine the policy of preservation of the stability of the 
marriage, irrespective of the subsequent attempts to reconcile. No fault was attributed to 
the biological father for any role in destabilizing the marriage of the putative father and 
mother. Stability is merely a factor to be considered as it relates to the potential negative 
impact it may have on a child to have his life disrupted by an outsider attacking a stable 
and intact family environment that exists for the child. That policy does not extend to 
preserving the solemnity of the marriage institution as it relates to the State's interests in 
preserving the institution of marriage itself. 
Appellee pontificates at length that a child's psychological tie to parents is 
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important and in need of protection, and that the stability of parent-child relationships that 
are formed within the marriage are significant to the well-being of society. (See, 
generally, Brief of Appellee at 18-22.) Appellants do not dispute this. In light of the 
Schoolcraft test, however, all of those policies are balanced against the importance of 
biological parents' rights. Appellee does nothing to demonstrate why Kelly should have 
heightened protection for the child when the marriage was clearly broken prior to the 
issue of Pete's intervention being considered by the trial court. The only question that 
the trial court must consider is whether there is a stable, intact marriage that requires 
heightened protection from the assault of a third party. 
The Court of Appeals and Appellee would have this Court adopt a standard which 
requires not only that the stability of a marriage be considered, but also the possibility of 
reconciliation after separation or even divorce. This result would prevent any person in 
Pete's position from ever having standing to assert his rights as a biological father. 
Contrary to Appellee's novel theory, under Schoolcraft the Court should only have given 
the marriage protection if the marriage was intact. This heightened protection was lost 
when Kim and Kelly separated and Kelly filed for divorce. 
2. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of Preserving a Marriage is 
Inconsistent with the Policies Expressed in the Uniform Parentage Act. 
Appellee cites the Model Uniform Parentage Act that was drafted by the National 
Conference on Commissioners in 2000, and amended in 2002, in arguing that there is a 
trend among states to limit or disallow a biological father from intervening to assert 
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paternity. The Model Act has a two year window in which a putative father can assert his 
paternal rights. Though not enacted as part of Utah's Parentage Act, this window would 
not be inconsistent with the trial court's decision in this case, because Pete's motion to 
intervene was made within fifteen (15) months of Zachary's birth. 
Appellee also cites In re CAW, 665 N.W. 2d 475, 478 (Mich 2003) for the 
proposition that a biological father does not have standing to intervene in a child's 
protective proceedings. The opinion in that case was based upon the fact that there had 
been no finding that the child was not an issue of the marriage; implying that had such a 
finding been made, the biological father would have been permitted to intervene. 
Appellee further argues that Utah's Uniform Parentage Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-
45g-101 et seq. enacted in 2005, supports the Court of Appeals' opinion. The Act is 
substantive, rather than procedural, because it substantially effects parental rights or 
duties relating to children. This court has previously found that a statute effecting or 
establishing a primary right and duty not in existence at the time that a claim arises may 
not be applied retroactively. Brown and Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 
P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) (citing Ball v. Peterson, 912 P2.dl006 (Utah Ct. App 1996)). Pete 
filed his Motion to Intervene in the divorce proceedings in January, 2001, four years 
before the Act was enacted. Judge Medley granted Pete's Motion to Intervene in 2002. 
Therefore, this statute does not apply in this case. 
Further, when introducing the bill in the 2005 Legislative Session, the sponsor, 
Senator Hillyard, specifically stated that the policy reasoning behind the Act was to 
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follow a nationwide move toward every child knowing the identity of his or her parents. 
(Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]), Addendum 1. Senator 
Hillyard and others emphasized that the Act provides a framework forjudges to follow, 
not precise answers. (Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]). 
Senator Hillyard stated that although the bill was family-oriented and structured so 
that a biological parent could not intervene in an intact marriage, that instances of divorce 
should be viewed differently. Senator Hillyard's statements infer that the policy 
considerations behind the bill were not specific to a biological father's intervention in a 
divorce action. (Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]). 
Although Utah's Parentage Act does not provide a statute of limitations, it does 
create a procedure to rebut a presumed fathers paternity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-
201(2), provides in relevant part, that "the father-child relationship is established by a 
man and child by (a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity under § 78-45g-
204... [or]... (c) an adjudication of the man's paternity." Pursuant to §78-45g-204 
Appellee is the presumed father of Zachary. While the Act creates a presumption that 
Appellee is Zachary's father, that presumption is rebuttable. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-
204.2, specifically states that a presumption of paternity established under that section 
may be rebutted in accordance with § 78-45g-607. Moreover, the Act provides that a 
proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by a man whose paternity of the 
child is to be adjudicated. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-602(3). 
Appellee argues in his brief that the Act, § 78-45g-607, sets forth a policy that 
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establishes a "strict limitations period and the doctrine of estopple to the paternity of 
children having a presumed father." (Brief of Respondent at 22.) In point of fact, § 78-
45g-607 only limits the time in which a mother or presumed father may bring a parentage 
action. It does not provide a limitation on the other entities who can declare paternity. 
The Act states that "paternity of a child conceived or born during the marriage with a 
presumed father may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any time prior to 
filing an action of divorce or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 (2006). With the exception of a mother and presumed 
father § 78-45g-607 does not prevent those listed in § 78-45g-602 including an "alleged 
father" from initiating a paternity action. 
The Legislative history makes clear that the purpose of § 78-45g~607 was to 
require divorcing parents to raise any paternity issues prior to or as part of a divorce 
proceeding, so that a mother or presumed father would be precluded from later using 
paternity issues to impact child support or parenting time. (Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen. 
Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]). Consequently,§ 78-45g-607 requires that the issue of 
paternity to be raised within the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents. 
Zachary's parentage and recognition that Pete is Zachary's biological father is 
contained throughout the entire record of proceedings. Appellee stated within his 
pleadings in the divorce action that Pete is the biological father of Zachary. {See, 
Complaint R. 2 f 7.) Kimberlee denied, Kelly's biological relationship with Zachary and 
affirmed that Pete was Zachary's biological father. (R. 20 f 7.) Furthermore, in Pete's 
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Motion for Intervention and subsequent paternity action, which was consolidated with the 
divorce action, Pete established that he was the biological father of Zachary through 
genetic testing. (R. 37-41; 992-999.) 
Kim raised the issue of paternity in the divorce case. Pete had no similar 
requirement. Nonetheless, Pete filed a paternity action which was consolidated into the 
divorce action. Thus, even if the Utah Uniform Parentage Act had been enacted at the 
time of commencement of this case, Pete's challenge to Kelly's paternity was timely. 
C. The Court of Appeals Erred in its Application of the Policy of 
Protecting Children from Disruptive and Unnecessary Attacks upon 
Their Paternity. 
This court, in Schoolcraft, stated that in determining whether an individual has 
standing to challenge the presumption of legitimacy depends on a factually sensitive and 
case-by-case analysis. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not consider the facts 
found by Judge Medley in making its determination that the challenge to Zachary's 
paternity was disruptive and unnecessary. The Court of Appeals relied primarily upon 
vacated findings contained in the Commissioner's recommendation of October, 2001. 
Basing its opinion on this vacated recommendation, the Court of Appeals found that Pete 
had little interest or involvement in Zachary's life until he was approximately 16 months 
of age. This is contrary to the record, which evidences that Pete wanted to be involved in 
Zachary's life and that he had multiple interactions with Zachary after his birth. The 
evidence also shows that upon Kim's separation from Kelly, Pete was able to significantly 
increase his interaction with Zachary. (R. 637-640, R. 2553.) 
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The Court of Appeals made further findings that Zachary had a father and was not 
in need of a different one (Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128 f 30) and that an attack 
on Zachary's paternity at this point "would be disruptive to Zachary's strong paternal 
relationship with his father." (Id. at f 33.) Neither of these findings is supported by any 
portion of the record and appear to be a moral judgment rather than one based on a 
factually sensitive assessment of the child and parties in this case. 
In his reply, Appellee glosses over the arguments presented by Appellants. 
Appellee, merely reiterates the Court of Appeals opinion. Based upon this Court's 
opinion in T.H v. R.C. (In re E.H.), 2006 UT 36 137 P.3d 809 trial courts must take into 
account and be sensitive to the particular facts of a given case. In the instant case, Judge 
Medley employed various tools and mechanisms for acquiring factual information in 
order to ensure that he and complied with the directive of Schoolcraft. 
The Court of Appeals, wholly ignored much of the findings and evidence of the 
trial court in their Opinion and merely stated that Zachary already had a father with whom 
he was bonded. Pearson, 2006 Ut App 128 f 30, 134 P.3d at 179. The court refused to 
recognize that Zachary was also bonded with Pete and that he later lived with Pete and 
Kim in an intact family unit. (Findings 7, 8, 9 and 10, R. 2337-38, 2473.) By relying 
primarily upon the vacated findings of the Commissioner and rejecting the substantial 
evidence that was before Judge Medley, the Court of Appeals improperly applied the 
necessity test. 
Further, Appellee has not responded to Appellants argument that by ignoring a 
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substantial portion of the record and the findings of Judge Medley, the Court of Appeals 
has substantially limited and/ or created a new "necessity" test that only looks at the child 
at one time, in the first few months after birth to determine whether a claim for paternity 
and establish paternal rights in unnecessary or not. This is an inflexible and inconsistent 
view of Schoolcraft and is not supported by statute or any other case law. In fact, this 
strict interpretation is contrary to the policy considerations of the Uniform Parentage Act, 
as discussed, supra, in section LB.2. When the Act was adopted in Utah, the articulated 
purpose was to ensure that a child's best interests would be considered in determining 
whether or not a biological father could intervene or adjudicate his paternity. 
The Court of Appeals' strict interpretation of the policy considerations in 
Schoolcraft also deny any consideration of what is in the best interest of Zachary. 
Zachary's best interests were specifically examined by Dr. Jill Sanders when Judge 
Medley asked Dr. Sanders whether or not Pete's intervention was unnecessary to Zachary. 
Dr. Sanders stated that Pete's involvement in Zachary's life was not only not disruptive, 
but necessary to his psychological well being. (Finding 12: R.980.) Such emphasis by Dr. 
Sanders and by Judge Medley as to the best interests of Zachary, is consistent with the 
policy considerations of Schoolcraft a swell as general policy considerations of this state. 
The Appellee argues that the Court of Appeals' approach in the instant case was 
consistent with the policy consideration of Wells v. Children Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984) and In re J.M and N.P. 940 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, 
both of these cases dealt with children who were born outside of a marriage, and involved 
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the issue of adoption and the need for permanent home. Neither are applicable. 
As evidenced by the record, Judge Medley used calculated and comprehensive 
steps to ensure Zachary's best interests were served. Based upon the evidence before 
him, Judge Medley found that granting Pete's intervention was not only unot disruptive, 
but necessary" to Zachary's psychological well being. The Court of Appeals wholly 
disregarded the trial courts thorough examination of Schoolcraft's policy considerations. 
D. The Court of Appeals Erred in Preventing Pete from Intervening in the 
Divorce Case to Protect his Liberty Right as a Parent. 
On December 22, 2000 Appellee commenced this case by filing a Complaint for 
Divorce and Custody Order. (R. 1-5.) On approximately January 15, 2001 Pete filed his 
Motion for Intervention (R. 37-41) in which he sought to intervene in order to obtain a 
judicial determination of his parentage of Zachary and for the purpose of protecting his 
"liberty interest provided for by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution and by the Utah State Constitution." (Verified Motion for 
Intervention, % 3, R. 37-41.) By ruling that Pete could not intervene in the case, the Court 
of Appeals effectively prevented him from protecting his parental rights in Zachary. 
Appellee argues that the Opinion should be affirmed because Pete had no 
constitutionally protected interest in Zachary at the time of the filing of his Motion to 
Intervene. The argument should be rejected because as a matter of constitutional law and 
state statute Pete's undisputed paternity gives him certain rights in Zachary. 
1. As Zachary's Biological Father Pete had the Right to Seek Custodial 
and Parent-Time Rights. 
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At all relevant times, including the date upon which Pete filed his Verified Motion 
and the date of the trial, the Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l et 
seq. was in effect.1 Section 78-45a-2(l) provided that "[pjaternity may be determined 
upon: (a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public authority 
chargeable by law with the support of the child...." Section 78-45a-10.5 stated: 
(1) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father, 
it may upon its own motion or upon motion of the father, 
order visitation rights in accordance with Sections 30-3-32 
through 30-3-37 [concerning parent-time awards in divorce 
cases] as it considers appropriate under the circumstances. 
(2) Visitation rights may not be granted to a father if the child 
has been subsequently adopted. 
Thus, under Utah law Pete as the "alleged" father, had the right to seek the award of 
parent-time, even if he were precluded from attacking Appellee's paternity. 
In addition, this court in Schoolcraft recognized that because of their special 
relationship to a child, individuals other than natural or legal parents may seek custody of 
that child. 799 P.2d at 714-715. By definition Pete, is a "close relative" to Zachary, as he 
is Zachary's biological father and the husband of Zachary's mother. 
The relationship between a parent and a child is constitutionally protected as a 
fundamental constitutional right and is often referred to as a "parental liberty right". See 
In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982); State ex rel. Rov Allen S. v. Stone. 196 
W.V. 624, 474 S.E. 2d 554, 561, 562 (W. V. 1996); and Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 US 
1
 The Act was repealed in 2005 and replaced by the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. 
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110, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
Pete sought leave to intervene both to protect his rights under the Uniform Act on 
Paternity and his constitutional rights. For the most part, the Opinion deals only with 
Pete's attempt to establish paternity under the Act. In its Opinion the Court relied heavily 
on the two-part test for standing in Schoolcraft which focuses on the question of who may 
challenge the presumption of paternity. In doing so it overlooked the second reason for 
Pete's Verified Petition: to establish the boundaries of his liberty right in Zachary. 
Though acknowledging that Pete is Zachary's biological father, the Court of 
Appeals adopted what amounts to a laches concluding that by failing to "perfect his 
inchoate parental rights" during the first sixteen months of Zachary's life, Pete lost those 
rights. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, f 36, 134 P.3d at 180. The Court's analysis 
concerning the loss of Pete's liberty interest in Zachary and its reference to an "inchoate 
parental right" are based upon it's analogizing this case to a situation in which a 
biological father fails to assert his rights in the child in a timely fashion. Pearson, 2006 
UT App 128, f 34, 134 P.3d at 180. 
Appellee, too, relies heavily on this analogy in his defense of the Opinion. (Brief 
of Respondent at 35-39.) The problem with this analysis is that the need for a speedy 
acknowledgment of paternity by a father whose illegitimate child has no legal father is 
not present in the situation where a child is born to a mother who is married. In the case 
of an adoption this Court has described the state's interest in obtaining a speedy 
determination of paternity as follows: 
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The state has a strong interest in speedily identifying those 
persons who will assume the parental role over such children, 
not just to assure immediate and continued physical care but 
also to facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to 
it parents.... To serve its purpose for the welfare of the child, 
a determination that a child can be adopted must be final as 
well as immediate. 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984). 
In light of that policy, Utah law requires that a father of an illegitimate child who 
wishes to preserve his liberty right in the child must do so before the child is adopted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(l)(e). By contrast, no Utah statute requires that a father in 
Pete's position take any particular steps in order to preserve his liberty right. 
In this case there is no public policy similar to that found in the divorce setting 
which would require Pete, even if he had been able to do so, to have more than occasional 
contacts with Zachary until Kim and Kelly had separated. In point of fact, however, once 
the Pearsons were separated, Pete established what the trial court found to be "frequent 
and consistent" contact with Zachary. (Findings f 9; R. 2438.) 
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that biology, standing alone, is not 
enough to create a liberty interest between a biological father and his child born out of 
wedlock. Where, however, a relationship between the father and the child has been 
established, the liberty right is entitled to constitutional protection. 
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child," [citation omitted] his 
interest in personal contact with his child requires substantial 
protection under the due process clause. 
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Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 102 S.Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983); J.W. v. State ex rel S. 
R , 2005 UT App 324, f 17, 119 P.3d 309, 313 (Utah 2005) (father's failure to register in 
New York's putative father registry coupled his with failure to cultivate his relationship 
with his child demonstrated a failure to commit to the responsibilities of parenthood). 
In this case the trial court found that Pete had not only established his paternity, 
but had proven the existence of a strong personal relationship between him and Zachary. 
Pete therefore had established a liberty right entitling him to exercise parent-time and 
custody. Such an award was made by the trial court based upon a finding that the granting 
of parent time and custody to Pete and Kim jointly was in the best interest of Zachary.2 
2. The Court of Appeals Refusal to Allow Pete To Intervene Prevented 
Him From Protecting His Liberty Right in Zachary. 
Utah R.Civ.P 24(a) defines the circumstances under which a person may intervene 
as a matter of right in a pending lawsuit. See, Addendum 2. 
The Court of Appeals held that Pete should not have been granted leave to 
intervene; however, rather than applying the criteria for determining the appropriateness 
of intervention found in Rule 24, it relied solely upon the two-prong test of Schoolcraft 
concerning standing. But Schoolcraft is not a case about intervention; it is a case about 
standing to question the paternity of the husband of the mother of a child born during 
their marriage. 
2
 Contrary to the impression left by Appellee's brief, he was awarded substantial parent-
time with Zachary. See Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Paragraphs 6 and 7. (R. 2505 -
2508.) 
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It is beyond question that Pete has a potential liberty right to maintain his 
relationship with Zachary and that he was entitled to intervene in the case to present 
evidence, not only of his paternity, but of his past relationship with Zachary. Appellee 
initially states that Pete has no protected liberty interest in Zachary (Brief of Respondent 
32-34), but later contradicts himself by discussing the clear parameters of the liberty 
interest that Pete does not have in Zachary and criticizes how Pete went about perfecting 
those liberty interests (Brief of Respondent 35-38.) The Court of Appeals' Opinion 
would prevent Pete from protecting his constitutional right and should be overruled. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS REFERENCES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
OCTOBER, 2001 ORDER WERE CRITICAL TO ITS OPINION. 
In his Brief, Appellee asserts that the Court of Appeals' references to the October, 
2001 Order were immaterial to the decision. That statement is incorrect in two aspects. 
First, it was not the "trial court's" Order that was relied upon, but the recommendation of 
a domestic relations commissioner, which was contained in that October, 2001, Order. 
Second, the Court of Appeals did indeed rely heavily upon the "facts" that the 
Commissioner articulated in that vacated October, 2001 Order. The Court of Appeals' 
reliance on that Order and the findings contained therein, fundamentally altered the 
court's reasoning and substantially undermined Judge Medley's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the resulting Order of November 7, 2002, granting intervention, 
as well as the court's May 8, 2003 Findings and Order on Intervenor's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
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The Court of Appeals specifically referred to the 2001 Order, and stated, "In light 
of those findings, we cannot say that Thanos' attack on Zachary's paternity would not 
have been disruptive to Zachary's paternal relationship with the father and expectations 
about whom his father was." Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, f 28, 134 P.3d at 179. 
Appellee argues that the Court of Appeals' reference to "findings" refers to Dr. Sanders' 
findings in her May 13, 2002 and August 26, 2002 reports. (Brief of Appellee at 40.) 
Even a cursory review of the Opinion reveals that its reference to "those findings" in 
paragraph 28, refers to the findings contained in paragraphs 25, 26 and 27. Those 
paragraphs specifically refer to and rely upon the vacated findings of the October, 2001 
Order. (See, Addendum 3, f j 25-28). Appellee has attempted to minimize the 
importance of the Court of Appeals reliance and references to the October, 2001 Order. 
Furthermore, Appellee failed to issue the question of the Court of Appeals' 
unconstitutional reliance upon and elevation of the recommendation of the Commissioner 
over the detailed findings of the Judge Medley. 
Appellee's argument, as set forth in Section II of his Brief, also contains the 
erroneous and conclusory statement that "the trial Court did not 'vacate' those facts, and 
did not vacate its findings." This statement is patently incorrect and contradicted by the 
clear language of the trial court's order of intervention, which stated in paragraph 1: "The 
Objection to Recommendation of Peter D. Thanos is sustained. The Order of 
Intervention, dated October 17, 2001, is hereby vacated." (Emphasis added.) (R. 972.) 
It is illogical and insupportable for the Appellee to argue that the Court of Appeals 
20 
could have included language from the October, 2001 Recommendation of Commissioner 
Michael S. Evans, in two full pages of its analysis (See, Paragraphs 25 through 28, 
Addendum 3), and yet conclude that it would have no effect on the Court of Appeals 
decision to overturn the trial court's granting of standing to Pete Thanos. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE PETITION 
FOR REHEARING BECAUSE ITS OPINION DOES NOT PROVIDE 
CLEAR GUIDANCE TO THE TRIAL COURT CONCERNING CUSTODY. 
The Court of Appeals should have granted the petition for rehearing to clearly state 
that the trial court may consider Pete's kinship relationship to his biological son. Appellee 
argues that Zachary's relationship to Pete, who is both his biological father and a current 
"functional" father, may be considered so long as that relationship is what Appellee calls 
"function-related" but not "biological." (Brief of Respondent at 48.) This 
biological/function-based dichotomy is not workable and is nowhere found in the 
Opinion. Similarly, Appellee's argument that the trial court should order a new trial and a 
new custody evaluation (Brief of Respondent at 43) is contrary to the Opinion which 
remanded the case for entry "of a new custody order." Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, f 39, 
134 P.3d at 181. Appellee's proposals are a tacit admission that the Opinion is flawed. 
A. If The Court of Appeals' Opinion Directs The Trial Court Not To 
Consider The Kinship Of Pete And Madeline To Zachary, It Should Be 
Reversed. 
If the Opinion is read as prohibiting the trial court from considering Zachary's 
biological relationship to Pete in awarding parent-time or custody, the decision should be 
reversed by this Court. Appellee argues that "biology plays no role in the custody 
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determination, and is not a factor to be considered in assessing [Appellee's] and Mother's 
respective custody claims in their two children". (Brief of Respondent at 45.) This claim 
is inconsistent with this court's decision in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982) and with C.J.A. Rule 4-903 (5)(E)(vii)which require the consideration of "kinship" 
in the awarding of custody. 
Appellee fails to explain why C.J.A. Rule 4-903 should be disregarded, but 
attempts to distinguish Hutchison by noting that when Hutchison listed "kinship" as a 
factor to be considered, 649 P.2d at 41, it cited as authority In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 
410 P.2d 475 (1966). Thus, argues Appellee, the kinship requirement applies only in 
cases involving the fact pattern in Cooper: namely, a situation in which a relative of a 
birth parent petitions for adoption after a child is taken permanently from the custody of 
the natural parents. There are two problems with this argument. First, this Court in 
Hutchison did not limit the kinship requirement to the very narrow fact pattern found in 
Cooper. Second, the decision in Cooper specifically states that "in custody matters, all 
things else being equal, near relatives should generally be given preference over non-
relatives.. ." 410 P.2d at 476. Thus the Court recognized that kinship is a factor 
"generally" to be considered. 
While it is true that both Hutchison and C.J.A. Rule 4-903 recognize that step-
parent status may be considered as a factor in a custody determination, the inclusion of 
that additional factor does not in any way diminish the primary meaning of "kinship" 
which is a "[Relationship by blood, marriage or adoption." Black's Law Dictionary 887, 
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(8th ed. 2004). Rather, the language of both Hutchison and the C.J.A. Rule 4-903 is simply 
an indication that an additional factor "in extraordinary circumstances" may be step-
parenthood. Pete unequivocally fulfills two of the three categories of "kinship." He is 
related to Zachary by both blood and marriage. 
B. The Trial Court, Rather Than An Appellate Court, Should Decide 
Whether the Kinship As Well As The Family's Complicated History, is 
Relevant to the Award of Custody, 
It is the trial court, not an appellate court, which is charged with determining what 
is in "the best interest of the child". Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a). Trial courts are 
given wide latitude in determining a child's best interest and their findings are only to be 
set aside by courts of appeal if it is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) This principle is 
consistent with the Schoolcraft rule, which only addresses a putative father's standing to 
attack a de jure father's paternity. The Schoolcraft analysis can be applied to the issue of 
whether Pete has standing to attack Kelly's paternity, but not his right to seek custody or 
parent-time of his biological son. In Schoolcraft this court stated, "[T]he fact that a 
person is not a child's natural or legal parent does not mean that he or she must stand as a 
total stranger to the child where custody is concerned." 799 P.2d at 714. 
Appellee argues that the Court of Appeals intended to exclude all evidence of the 
biological relationship of Zachary to his biological parents and sister. Thus in Appellee's 
view it is irrelevant that Zachary's mother is living with his biological father and sister 
and that the evaluator and the trial judge found that the three children should not be 
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separated (Finding 34.b., R. 2449), and unimportant that the evaluator testified that "the 
relationship between parents and their biological children is psychologically extremely 
important." (Finding 17, R. 2441.) Appellee contends that as the trial court considers 
how to apportion custody, it may not consider that Zachary is living in his own 
biologically intact family. Instead, says the Appellee, the trial court should be instructed 
that it may only consider "function-related factors": i.e. the children's functioning in the 
home of Appellee and the Appellants. (Brief of Respondent at 48.) 
This proposed "function-related" rule—at least in the form proposed by 
Appellee—is unworkable. It is not realistic to suppose that a trial judge or a custody 
evaluator can separate the biological component of a child's relationship with his father, 
mother or sibling from the sociological component.3 Pete is not Zachary's step-father; 
nor is he a complete stranger who arrived sometime during Zachary's childhood. Pete is a 
biological parent, who has been a part of Zachary's life. Zachary looks like Pete. The 
trial court should not be instructed to overlook this kinship relationship or Pete's 
relationship with Zachary up to the time of trial in determining what type of custody 
arrangement is in Zachary's best interest. The exclusion of evidence of kinship and of the 
Thanoses' efforts to establish an intact family unit proposed by Appellee should be 
rejected. The correct rule, is to reaffirm that the trial judge is in the best position to 
3
 "The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an 
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he 
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, 
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable 
contributions to the child's development." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 262. 
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decide to what degree kinship should be taken into account in deciding what is in the best 
interest of Zachary. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has rendered an opinion that has substantially modified the 
Schoolcraft test. The Court's mechanistic and insensitive Opinion has created an 
artificial statute of limitations that is inharmonious and inconsistent with Utah policy 
outlined by this court in Schoolcraft. 
Further, the Court of Appeals based its Opinion on substituted facts by erroneously 
relying on the recommendation of the Commissioner, which was later vacated by the 
careful findings of the trial court. If upheld, the Court of Appeals decision, will deny Pete 
his constitutional rights and leave biological fathers and their children without means to 
establish, nurture and maintain a parent-child relationship. 
Pete and Kim Thanos respectfully request that this court reverse the opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. 
DATED this / • d a y of November, 2006. 
CORPORON WILLIAMS & BRADFORD RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
XlE if. WILLIAMS ^ STE^N H^GUNN 
JARROD H. JENNINGS -—~~~ " ~~ Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
Attorneys for Intervenor/Appellant Kimberlee Thanos 
Pete Thanos 
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Tabl 
Senate Bill 14, Uniform Heritage Act, Senator Hillard 
Senator Hillard, I am sure there is no question about this bill. 
1 Thank you Mr. President. I told Senator Chris Butters that I grew up in cache valley that 
2 after boy scouts there for any period of time, you heard the old Ephraim story so many 
3 times, that you could repeat it, and so this bill has been here before and I have explained it 
4 before and there were a lot of questions raised and interest in this bill and let me just 
5 explain to you that sometimes when we focus on the surrogate part of it we miss the two 
6 most important parts of the bill and really why it was done. The first part of the bill, deals 
7 with an effort that really started nationally and in every state and I am glad to say that it is 
8 not as big an issue in Utah as in many states and that's with the prowess that every child 
9 who is born ought to know who the parents are and so often times we have unwed 
10 mothers giving birth to children and we have never really taken the step, well we can now 
11 with DNA tests, to determine the parentage and have not only the issue of financial 
12 responsibility but health issues as well so that we know some of the things inherited by 
13 that. But what this great (in audible) of DNA we can make that identification, we have 
14 opened up areas of the law that really have not been adequately addressed by the 
15 legislature and I really think there is a need for us to do that in this regard, because if we 
16 don't, then the courts will be forced to make the decision. That is really the challenge in 
17 Utah law right now is that different judges make different rulings. The first part of this 
18 bill really deals with parentage, and what it creates a little bit ago somebody asked what 
19 the difference was with the uniform that I was on the committee that drafted, here in Utah 
20 we have given even greater emphasis as to what I will call the social father. Senator Hale 
21 gave me a letter that was pretty touching of a woman who married into a family the 
22 husbands wife had just died with three little children and she was the mother as a I recall 
23 for 8 years for that time period. There was a divorce and there was an immediate marriage 
24 3 days after and married another woman and blocked her form having her have any 
25 contact with any of these children because she was not the biological mother. When you 
26 see some of those things happen in children's lives, you often see often times see a step 
27 mother or step father can be even a better father than the biological parent. So this court 
28 this bill doesn't answer the question precisely in every case, but it gives guidelines to the 
29 courts to create consistency across our state so that these biological situations, while very 
30 important, may be overridden in certain cases taking into concern the best interests of the 
31 children. I can imagine the trauma for those children and the mother after 8 eight years of 
32 being in all sense the mother of these children, being barred because she is not 
33 biologically the mother. So this bill would give some relief in that area and give the court 
34 some guidelines and protection. I can tell you that this bill is very family oriented and 
35 family privy. We followed the president of a California case where if you have an 
36 attacked marriage, for example, that the biological parent could not interfere with that 
37 intact marriage. A California case involved a husband and wife they separated, and the 
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1 wife lived with another man, and became pregnant at that point in time the husband 
2 accepted her back. So she moved back and the resumed their marriage relationship and 
3 then the baby was born and the biological wanted visitation. And the court in this bill says 
4 the same thing, that parents together create the family. Now if they were getting divorced 
5 there would be a different situation involved. There is also different guidelines (in 
6 audible) tells me that a constant problem that they have is that people get divorced, 5-10 
7 years later the father now is not having visitation with his children, I mean a bad situation, 
8 he then has a DNA test, which can now be taken fairly simply, discovers that he is not the 
9 biological father, so he want r4s to not only terminate the child support, which would go 
10 retroactive back to the time of the divorce and pay the money back, and again we address 
11 this issue mainly on the person having reasonable notice, now I say that because I could 
12 answer some questions on this. One of the difficult things in doing family law cases 
13 before the legislature is the fact that all of us have had a niece who got a divorce 4 years 
14 ago and it turned out bad and we want to make sure that the law protects here. It is sad to 
15 say most of us have been touche with divorce in our immediate families which I guess for 
16 my parents and grandparents did not turn out the same. But with the divorce, visitation, 
17 DNA testing these factors I think are important. I presented this bill at the midwinter 
18 meeting of the Utah State Bar and there were a number of district court judges who came 
19 up and said please, please get this bill passed, because it does give some guidelines to 
20 help up us in some very difficult areas. The second part of the bill is really part of the 
21 adoption counsel. We have been very careful in this bill to protect biological fathers who 
22 want to maintain a relationship with the children that they helped to have born. And we 
23 have also put some pretty strict guidelines that if they done adhere to these procedures, 
24 their parental rights can be terminated. One of the issues that the adoption counsel told me 
25 is that our current law has different mechanisms in which you file notice of paternity of 
26 claim. The trouble for the adoption agency is that when they to perceive the claim, they 
27 have to check the registry to make sure no father has filed a claim and it is not technically 
28 that registry then they can proceed with that adoption without his consent and so some 
29 fathers have actually filed some claims that have not been properly registered and they 
30 have been failed to be protected. I cannot think of a more horrible circumstance for any 
31 lawyer of family than to place the child for adoption, to have the adoption done and for 
32 someone to come back four of five years later somebody comes back with a legal 
33 technicality problem and that makes the adoption not valid and now you are faced with 
34 losing your child. So I really appreciate the help of the adoption counsel and again this 
35 law is slightly different in that regard because of unique Utah Circumstances. The third 
36 thing that has the most publicity, and I'll tell you, when we started talking about this on 
37 the committee, about a surrogacy law, I said that there is no way that I will ever carry a 
38 bill that is initially proposed in Utah. I knew the Utah over ten years passed a law, 
39 outlawing surrogate parenting, so that you understand that law doesn't make it a crime, 
40 that law simply makes it that the agreements cannot be enforced. So that you and your 
41 wife are contracted with a third person, a surrogate, a woman to carry your child and she 
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1 got the to the end of the birth period and said " no I am going to keep the child" under 
2 Utah law you could not enforce the agreement, because we just made it illegal to do that. 
3 Also, since I have filed this bill and some of the publicity, I am sure that it is going on in 
4 Utah right now. Many of the people who want the protection of the law have to leave 
5 Utah and go outside of Utah to have it done in their protection. What really brought this, 
6 and you will know this when you see the draft as we did as a commission, we bracketed 
7 this part, which meant you could adopt the uniform law and not do anything gestational 
8 agreements and still have uniform laws. It was really an optional part of it. I will tell you 
9 the thing that really changed my mind, were two things, I was really impressed to be there 
10 with that committee we had a number of the supreme court of Montana, we had a court of 
11 appeals justice from Minnesota, who severed in the legislature, we have several law 
12 professors, we had lawyer from Texas, we had a former state senator who was a lawyer 
13 out of Kansas, we had the head the head of the Office of Recovery Services from 
14 Massachusetts, all working on drafting this bill, and when we started talking about the 
15 matter it became our goal in drafting this bill, to make it family, marriage privy. As you 
16 read in the papers this morning, the main people who criticize this bill say that I don't go 
17 far enough. We agreed as a committee, it was not just something that was drafted up in 
18 my office in Logan, it took a number of meetings from people from all over, and when 
19 people say that it's unconstitutional, I guess anything can be unconstitutional, but we feel 
20 that this law is very clear, because what we have allowed is god forbidden, you now have 
21 an area, if you do something that does not follow this law, you don't have the protection 
22 of the law, we say meeting these categories: No. 1, you have to be a married couple, No. 
23 2. The intended mother has to have a serious health problem, so that to do the surrogacy 
24 she has to have some medical evidence that she just doesn't want to be bothered with the 
25 pregnancy, No. 3. The surrogate mother has to have gone through a pregnancy before, so 
26 she understands physically what she is going through and that it is all pre approved by the 
27 court. If the court that the surrogate mother needs more counseling if there are parts of it 
28 that the compensation agreed to is too high or too low, we have the protection of the 
29 courts to do that. Then that becomes the argument, should we let everybody? I don't think 
30 so. Quite frankly, if the amended bill provides that anyone should do this to non married 
31 couples, I would take that part out of that bill. I will not sponsor a bill that has that 
32 provision. There may be areas that can be expanded, but I want to take this first step into 
33 it, so that we have further protection. What really the second thing, besides the fact that I 
34 feel, is the final draft in this bill was something that I could defend and that I could 
35 represent and I could feel good about was the fact that we had a federal district court 
36 decision here a year or so ago, where the federal district court held that our law banning it 
37 made it unconstitutional, excuse me making it unlawful, in that particular case if you read 
38 the facts of the court, you have a couple in California, who hired a surrogate mother and 
39 took his sperm and her egg and then planted it in the surrogate mother. They were they 
40 intended parents but also the biological parents. Then the woman came to Utah gave birth 
41 to the baby and they went to get a birth certificate. Our state law is that the birth mother is 
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1 the biological mother, and so the presumption was that they had to have a birth certificate 
2 with the birth mother on. The law suit was filed saying "no that is unconstitutional 
3 because they are the biological parents and they should be on the birth certificate". The 
4 irony is when you read judge Jenkins decision, although he says that our proposition 
5 making it unlawful violates their constitutional rights, those circumstances, he never 
6 solved the problem of the birth certificate. And actually our department of health issued a 
7 new birth certificate and that is really one of the protections of this bill. So let me just 
8 touch what this bill does. It would be easier to say what it doesn't do, but what it does do, 
9 is it provides for a married couple, who meet these criteria, to go to the court and get an 
10 agreement and once that agreement is approved then when the baby is born, the birth 
11 mother says "no, I don't want to give the child up", tough, she made an agreement, about 
12 the adoption then the baby is delivered back. It provides a birth certificate that the 
13 intended parents, it may be a situation where they have purchased a egg and it is the 
14 man's sperm, or some other criteria to do this, the birth of the intended parents by this 
15 court, would then show up on the birth certificate as the parents. So it would deal with 
16 that issue as well. You may have the intended parents who say the child was born 
17 handicapped and they don't want the child, tough, they for all intense the parents of this 
18 handicapped child, and they cant back out either. One of the things that I like about this 
19 bill, is I also have a provision here that says , that if you do this without court approval, 
20 and a baby is born in this world, and you are not talking about adoption, you are creating 
21 a child, you are not talking about a child that is already here, it is about you creating a 
22 child, if that child is born and you do not have a legal binding agreement, then the court 
23 can step in and order appropriate child support. The court ought to make that 
24 determination on a case by case basis. The way that we have it now, I would assume, that 
25 the birth mother give birth to the baby, and the intended parents say that I do not want the 
26 child, or I want a boy and it's a girl, I wanted a blonde not brunette so I do not want the 
27 child. The way it is, there is no way to force it one way or another. I would assume that 
28 child will probably end up in an adoption agency to be placed for adoption. Or the mother 
29 may feel that she will keep the child, or whatever may go on. So, I say that with this 
30 regard because there are groups who say I.... I want to address a letter that I received the 
31 morning of our hearing in the committee from the ACLU, I almost cheered when I got it, 
32 because I know that it is not really an issue that is going to destroy my bill. But you know 
33 it always kind of concerns me when I get a letter the morning of a hearing when a bill has 
34 been around for 2 years. They could have told me before hand, but let me just address 
35 this. They have four concerns about my bill. First of all, they say that it too narrowly 
36 draws the provision for termination of gestational agreement. Their concern is that they 
37 think the gestational mother should be able to terminate this agreement at any time up to 
38 what they say at least 24 hours after the birth of her child. They have not heard my bill. 
39 Because the bill says once approved by the judge, it is a binding agreement, and the 
40 gestational mother cannot come in three months later into the pregnancy and say "gosh, I 
41 have decided that I do not want to give this child up." I mean that is what the court 
Page 4 
1 procedure that I will go through, so she loses that right when she goes before the court 
2 and she sings the agreement and agrees to be the gestational mother, she has agreed to do 
3 that. Now, I guess the judge would have to say if the woman did not know, to say "well 
4 do not sign the agreement." I cannot give her what they want, number 2 and number one 
5 because it would destroy the whole intent of the bill, and the whole purpose of having it. 
6 Number 2, it says the intended mother, ok they were concerned because I require the 
7 intended mother to have a health problem before getting into this contract. I thought that 
8 it was really interesting, I would like to read this,.... the us supreme court has made a 
9 fundamental right to chose whether to bear or begat a child they then moved and moved 
10 this one step further and say that woman have a fundamental right to chose when the 
11 contract with the gestational mother whether they can have an abortion. I don't really 
12 understand how that gets to be a fundamental right, and I would like to see the court case 
13 fight for that. So, that is their concern that we are violating the intended mother's right if 
14 she decides not to have children for whatever reason she wants to (in audible) this 
15 agreement, that we have violated her rights. Again I would say that what we are doing 
16 here is authorizing under certain circumstances for it to be done. The third thing is the 
17 requirement for this couple to be married. They think that is unconstitutional. I'll let 
18 senator Chris Butters bring up that issue. And the fourth one is we provided here that the 
19 gestational mother here for her health to be able to have an abortion if that is her choice, 
20 to do that. I have had some people say that you should limit that and I say listen, you have 
21 got a gestational mother who has been through a pregnancy before, she has come before 
22 the court and gone through all of that, I cannot for the life of me imagine, if she asks to 
23 have an abortion, it is a very serious health problem to her. I don't want to try and get into 
24 and define all of that, I think that is optional thing. Since I have filed this bill and had 
25 committee hearings, I have not asked, but I have had a number of surrogate mothers come 
26 up to you and it just touches your heart. Some of the people who very much want to have 
27 children, cant. But through this process of surrogacy, they can even take their own egg or 
28 sperm from the husband and can create a child that they not only know theirs emotionally 
29 but biologically and so I say this maybe I am doing well because we have groups on both 
30 sides that say I go too far and I don't go far enough, I really feel comfortable with the 
31 work that we did on a committee of certainly as diverse as you will ever find that worked 
32 on this parenting bill on a national level to come up with this proposal. I think in light if 
33 we don't pass the surrogacy part of this bill then I will submit to where we were when 
34 Judge Jenkins decision of absolute no mans land in what we are doing in this area. I think 
35 anyone can feel comfortable with how far we have come. Does anyone have any 
36 questions? Thank you Senator. 
37 
38 Thank you Mr. President, I do have a question of the sponsor. 
39 
40 Thank you. 
41 
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1 Correct me if I am wrong, Senator, did I hear you say that towards the end of your 
2 presentation that this bill authorizing abortion on demand. 
3 
4 No. What I said... I will read you that part of the bill. The bill provides the gestational 
5 mother for her health to make her own health decisions as to what's going on. So if the 
6 issue got to be that the doctor said, this woman is going to die with this pregnancy, she 
7 makes the decision as to whether to keep the pregnancy. 
8 
9 Well isn't that the case now. Please make it clear. 
10 
11 See, I need to understand Mr. President if you don't' mind if I could follow up. I just 
12 want to make sure that I understand that the bill requires the same level of medical 
13 involvement for lack of a better term that we currently have that is only in the case where 
14 the mother's health of the baby's health is in jeopardy. I want to make sure that we are 
15 not softening that position by this bill and if you can assure me that is the case, then that 
16 would be fine, 
17 
18 I feel comfortable saying yes it does. 
19 
20 The concern we have is when we did this agreement starting out, the whole emphasis is to 
21 give everyone protection in you know what you have . So the concern of what may 
22 happen (in audible). 
23 
24 One more, you indicated in your comment that the mother will make the decision as to 
25 whether she wants to carry the child based on her opinion as to the impact that it might 
26 have on her health and I want to know specifically if the bill addresses specifically 
27 addresses the involvement of her doctor in that decision. 
28 
29 Though the gestational agreement may not limit the right of the gestational mother to 
30 make the decision to safeguard her health and that of the unborn fetus. So it leaves it open 
31 as a gestational agreement as to what exactly what those terms would be, that you could 
32 not (in audible) choose to do something for her own health that would jeopardize the fetus. 
33 
34 I have not spelled out that, and I will tell you the reason that you don't want to do that is 
35 the Supreme Court could change those decisions you don't want (in audible) the statute. It 
36 will be the gestational agreement. That the gestational agreement cannot grant any right 
37 under that agreement that is currently prohibited by the law. Senator butters? 
38 
39 I don't know where it is, but I think that we ought to find it. Senator Hilliard you know 
40 we never have a bill under 1000 lines this is one is right on edge at 1475. Having said that 
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1 my committee the last couple of years, (in audible) all over senator Hilliard about the 
2 gestational agreement. I believe that you have done a wonderful job. 
3 
4 Senator walker? 
5 
6 Thank you Mr. President. I guess speaking is only what 5 of us in here can . I look at this 
7 as a mother and a grandmother I think how hard it would be to do this. My question is, 
8 does the mother have legal counsel when she goes to court separate from the parents. I 
9 would suspect that the trial judge when he approves this has a lot of different 
10 expressionary things that he could do. I think that if the judge felt any uncomfortable 
11 position with the mother that he could advise her to get an attorney, a psychologist, 
12 counseling whatever that is really the intent to do that. So we have not required it but we 
13 have required the court approval and so I think that will cover your issue. 
14 
15 I wonder, there are a million different scenarios who goes through pregnancy and who 
16 gives that child up for adoption and then she needs money and she decides that she wants 
17 to be a surrogate mother. I wonder if we shouldn't have more specificity in there about a 
18 mother. You know I have been reading the articles that they have had in the tribune on 
19 surrogacy. That woman, I mean, it does sound like a wonderful and beautiful thing for her 
20 and what a blessing that it is tot hat Japanese family who is going to receive that baby. I 
21 do worry about, and I guess because I have never been a surrogate mother, I have only 
22 been a mother of my own child and I can't imagine giving up a baby and I worry about a 
23 mother who thinks that she can do this and who has not fully considered the ramifications 
24 whether you talk about a mother that gives up a child for adoption or a woman has an 
25 abortion and I just worry about that birth mother because when you have a child within 
26 you, and you feel that life, it would be difficult to give that up. 
27 
28 I would agree. I have seen adoptions where moms have given up children and I know 
29 how difficult that would be from viewing that. Senator Walker I will give you the 
30 commitment that I gave Senator Butters, he raised the issue about the money. I really 
31 want to monitor this with the courts and see what happens because I may have judges 
32 come back to me and say, you know you ought to make this change or that change, 
33 because you know again, I have met some marvelous surrogate mothers who do this and I 
34 mean they take it as almost a mission in life that they can give life to a couple who so 
35 desperately need it and cannot do it themselves. I want to compliment Kristen Stewart for 
36 the article she wrote in the Tribune I didn't have anything to do with it, but I am trying to. 
37 But I think that those articles put light to this deal that in a way that for many of us, 
38 especially us men, who don't really understand what you must go through, but again, 
39 there are such marvelous things that are happening now in science. Just think back a few 
40 years ago there were some woman who could never ever have a hope of having a child 
41 and now have one because of what they have been able to do. So I appreciate your 
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1 concern and I give you that commitment that I will follow what the courts are doing and if 
2 I sense your concern at all, I understand what you are talking about. Thank you Senator 
3 Walker. 
4 
5 Thank you Mr. President. I want to compliment you for the amount of work that has gone 
6 into this bill for many years. It is important legislation and something that we all need to 
7 consider very seriously. I will be supporting the legislation, but I am still left with some 
8 questions. I agree with the thoughts here that we certainly don't wont to allow woman 
9 who are so busy doing other things that they do not want to go through pregnancy to be 
10 able to enter into a contract for a surrogate mother. On the hand, I have had doctors call 
11 me and ask how did they determine what is unreasonable to the physical or mental health 
12 of the surrogate mom. That is a difficult thing to determine and there are some concerns 
13 there. I also had a mother call and leave a voice mail for me that really tore at my heart. 
14 She was not able to have a child because of problems with her uterus. So after saving 
15 money and a consultation with medical experts she went in with her husband and donated 
16 her eggs and his sperm and after quite a period of time, they were able to find a surrogate 
17 who was able to deliver for them their first child. After that, after many years, her 
18 husband passed away and they still have eggs and they still have sperm and that she 
19 would like to use those to have another child so that her child would not be an only child 
20 but under this bill, she is now a single mother, and she would not be given the protection 
21 of Utah law, no she will not be criminally prosecuted, but she would not be able to get a 
22 Utah birth certificate for this second child and I wonder if really want to exclude a 
23 situation like that. I understand that there a lot of different examples that we could all 
24 come up with and we certainly do not want to take things too far. But I think that we need 
25 to look at this in the future, that maybe there some other concerns for protection. 
26 
27 Senator Peters: Thank you Mr. President. When you see a bill like this, I think that 
28 everyone takes a pause because of the sensitive nature of these things. So I want you to 
29 know that I am taking this bill very seriously. I believe that I have softened on most of 
30 the issues that make me nervous. Just on one, on line 1432, as I read that it says that in a 
31 nonbinding gestational agreement it goes from 1432 to 1435, if you are a surrogate 
32 mother and you are not in a binding agreement with someone and you decide to keep the 
33 child, it looks to me like this language makes you liable for some of these expenses of this 
34 child. Am I reading that correctly? 
35 
36 That is right. 
37 
38 Could you just give me basis. Maybe I agree with you philosophically with you, but you 
39 know we had a couple who was denied the ability to raise the child and I am just 
40 wondering the logic behind it. Do you understand the question? 
41 
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1 I do, Senator Peters. I appreciate the question. Let me explain. The real emphasis of that 
2 section is the intended parents who have this, go through this gestational agreement that is 
3 non binding because of whatever reasons, it wasn't approved by court, they are taking 
4 advantage of her, whatever the case might be, and then the baby is born. The question is if 
5 she keeps the child I would assume that would be treated by DCFS, just as if a single 
6 woman had gotten pregnant and now wanted to raise the baby. She cannot name the 
7 father or the father was killed or the father has gone away. Then DCFS has a problem. I 
8 think in this particular case I think that at that point in time, not only would she accept the 
9 (in audible), she would accept the responsibility of the child and part of that would be is 
10 that she would have to care for the child as her own. The other issue, she would have the 
11 right to go back to court and say you know that I don't want this child, then will place this 
12 child with DCFS for placing. DCFS, then with our state tax dollars, could go after the 
13 intended parents and say, even though you didn't take the child, you didn't want the child 
14 because the child was handicapped, we are going to deem you as the parents and you are 
15 going to have to pay child support obligation to the cost of the tax payers of the state of 
16 Utah. The concern that I have right now, is that if this bill doesn't pass, you have got the 
17 wide open question that if the surrogate mother keeps the child, I think we treat it just like 
18 a single mother having a child, assuming that she is single. Surrogate mothers can be 
19 married. But on the other hand, you would have a chance that to go back to the intended 
20 parents and say that started this ship down the river, which now has no pilot on the ship, 
21 but you have got to pay for some of the fuel to get it down to the end. 
22 
23 In that case we get some difference of those natural parents to that placement of the child 
24 once DCFS takes custody. Again I hope that question makes sense, but it seems like there 
25 should be quite a bit of difference to the natural parents as to where the child should end 
26 up. I think any lawyer can figure out a way to do that. 
27 
28 Do you just tell the intended parents to take the child as though the child were yours and 
29 then place the child for adoption. I cannot solve the problem about the birth certificate 
30 until we go one step further, but in that particular, if you had an unintended it is going to 
31 show the birth mother as the biological birth mother and her name is going to be on the 
32 birth certificate. I think that at that particular point, I think that if the birth mother doesn't 
33 want the child, I suspect then the intended parents could take the child and through an 
34 attorney do a private placement of that child in a way that the child can then be handled. I 
35 do not know an agency that would not accept the child, even handicapped, even a mixed 
36 racial, that would not take the child to place the child for adoption. I just think that it is 
37 important, that if you are going to create a life, you are going to be instrumental in 
38 creating a life, not only are there blessings but there are responsibilities. Now, I think that 
39 is what this bill does. Thank you senator. 
40 
41 Lets see if anyone else wants to be recognized. 
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1 It is really hard to summarize this bill. There is really one thing that I want to point out. 
2 When I started this bill, a couple of years ago, I brought together what I thought to be 
3 some of the best what I thought to be some of the best family practitioner lawyers in the 
4 state. We worked through this bill, and that is why the emphasis on the social parent is 
5 different. Harry (in audible), who chaired our committee, a very prominent family lawyer 
6 in Houston Texas, has been following to say, he's given me his blessing that they deem 
7 this to be the inner court law if we pass it as drafted now. So, I would certainly be glad to 
8 answer further questions. In fact, DCFS, or excuse me Office of Recovery Services, has 
9 prepared a summary for me of every section of this bill showing current Utah law as a 
10 guess it summary because it is unsettled, and you just kind of have to guess which judge 
11 will do, what they think the opinion is, what's statutory and what this changes, and I 
12 would be glad to give that to anyone who wants this single section of our section and see 
13 exactly the changes in Utah law and the clarifications made. With that I call for questions 
14 on the bill. 
15 
16 When a question has been called should Senate Bill 14 be read for the third time 
17 
18 Senator Allen, Aaron, Bill, Randall, Christensen, Davis, Evans, (in audible), Hales, 
19 Hatch, (in audible), Inkman, Billiard, Jenkins, Brandon, Kilpack, Knudson, Madsen, 
20 Mansell, Maine, Peterson, Stevenson, Thomas, Blanik, Walker, Valentine. 
21 
22 I have two. Senate Bill 14 received 24 yes votes, 0 nay votes, with 5 being absent, will be 
23 read for the third time. 
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Tab 2 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - RULE 24 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or 
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
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OPINION: [**174] THORNE, Judge: 
[*P1] Kelly F. Pearson (Father) appeals from the 
trial court's supplemental decree of divorce awarding 
joint legal custody of the minor child Z.P. to Kimberlee 
Y. Pearson (Mother) and intervenor Peter D. Thanos. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Father and Mother (collectively the Pearsons) 
married in 1992. In July 1997, the couple had their first 
child, N.P. In late 1998, Mother became pregnant again, 
and a second son, Z.P., was bom in September 1999. 
[*P3] Unbeknownst to Father, Mother had been 
involved in a romantic relationship with Thanos 
beginning sometime in 1996. Mother believed from early 
on in her pregnancy with Z.P. that Thanos was Z.P.'s 
biological father. She informed Father about her affair 
[***2] with Thanos and her belief about Z.P.'s paternity 
in March 1999. Despite Mother's infidelity, the Pearsons 
stayed together in an attempt to make their marriage 
work. Father agreed to raise Z.P. as his own, and Mother 
agreed to treat Father as Z.P.'s natural father. Z.P. was 
bom in September 1999, and Father was named as Z.P.'s 
father on his birth certificate. Father and Mother raised 
Z.P. together until they separated in May 2000. After 
separation and until the trial court's custody 
determination, the Pearsons voluntarily shared physical 
custody of Z.P. on a fifty-fifty basis, nl 
nl Thanos and Mother married in July 2002, 
shortly after the trial court granted Mother's 
request to bifurcate this case and entered a decree 
of divorce between the Pearsons. Thanos and 
Mother subsequently had another child, daughter 
M.T., whose custody is not implicated in this 
case. Also, despite the relationship between 
Mother and Thanos prior to N.P.'s birth, there is 
no suggestion that Thanos is N.P.'s biological 
father. 
[*P4] [***3] Mother informed Thanos in January 1999 
that she believed him to be Z.P.'s biological father. 
Thanos was unwilling to be known or recognized as the 
child's father and did not provide any monetary support 
toward Z.P.'s prenatal care or birth costs. Thanos 
acquiesced in Father's role as Z.P.'s father. From birth 
until about January 2001, the first sixteen months of 
Z.P.'s life, Thanos did not provide any care or support for 
Z.P. and only saw him about half a dozen times. 
[*P5] In December 2000, Father initiated divorce 
proceedings. Thanos moved to intervene in the 
proceedings in January 2001, claiming that he was Z.P.'s 
biological father. Concurrently, Mother denied Father's 
paternity of Z.P. in her answer and asked the trial court to 
declare that Father was not Z.P.'s biological father and 
that he had no rights of custody or visitation with Z.P. 
Father opposed both motions. The commissioner hearing 
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the matter determined that Thanos lacked standing to 
contest Z.P.'s paternity. 
[*P6] Thanos and Mother objected to the 
commissioner's standing decision. The trial court 
determined that the issue was governed by In re J.W.F., 
799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), and that it [***4] needed 
additional information to adequately address the policy 
considerations set forth in that case. The trial court 
appointed Dr. Jill Sanders to provide the court with an 
independent Schoolcraft analysis. n2 Sanders was to 
address the second prong of the Schoolcraft test-whether 
permitting Thanos to seek paternity of Z.P. [**175] 
would be disruptive to Z.P.'s relationship with Father. 
She concluded that Thanos's presence in Z.P.'s life would 
not be inherently harmful to Z.P. or to Z.P.'s relationship 
with Father. 
n2 The term "Schoolcraft analysis" refers to 
the analysis set forth in In re J. W.F., 799 P. 2d 
710 (Utah 1990), and is named for the petitioner 
in that case. A Schoolcraft analysis determines a 
person's standing to challenge the presumption of 
legitimacy of a child born into a marriage, based 
primarily on two policy considerations: 
"preserving the stability of the marriage and 
protecting children from disruptive and 
unnecessary attacks upon their paternity." Id. at 
713. 
r***5i 
[*P7] After considering Sanders's conclusions and 
the Schoolcraft factors, the trial court granted Thanos's 
motion to intervene in November 2002. Addressing the 
first prong of the Schoolcraft analysis, the trial court 
concluded that "the interest in preserving the stability of 
the [Pearsons'] marriage is not a consideration, due to the 
fact that there is no marriage to preserve. The stability 
was shattered when the parties separated and [Z.P.] was 
approximately nine months of age." As to the second 
prong, the court relied on Sanders's report to conclude 
that Thanos's challenge would not be "disruptive to Z.P. 
or an unnecessary attack on his paternity," and was "in 
the best interests of the child." 
[*P8] Father and Thanos both filed motions for 
summary judgment on the issue of Z.P.'s paternity. On 
May 8, 2003, the trial court granted Thanos's motion and 
denied Father's motion. The court's ruling determined 
Thanos to be the natural, biological, and legal father of 
Z.P. 
[*P9] The trial court issued its custody decision on 
May 11, 2004. Relying on its previous paternity 
determination, the court applied the parental presumption 
n3 in favor of Mother over Father [***6] as regards to 
Z.P. The trial court next determined that Thanos's 
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parental presumption over Father had been rebutted, 
finding that for the first fifteen months of Z.P.'s life, 
Thanos "did not have a strong mutual bond" with Z.P., 
"did not demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice his own 
interests and welfare for [Z.P.], and generally lacked the 
sympathy for and understanding of [Z.P.] that is 
characteristic of parents generally." See Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) (listing factors 
for rebuttal of parental presumption). Accordingly, the 
trial court placed Father and Thanos on an equal footing 
and made its custody determination between them based 
solely on the best interests of Z.P. See id. 
n3 The parental presumption is "the 
presumption in favor of awarding custody to a 
natural parent over a nonparent." Davis v. Davis, 
2001 UTApp 225,P1, 29 P.3d 676. 
[*P10] The trial court granted Mother and Thanos 
joint legal custody and primary physical custody [***7] 
of Z.P. Mother and Father were granted joint legal 
custody of N.P., with primary physical custody in 
Mother. Father was granted "joint physical custody time" 
with N.P. and Z.P. The boys rotated between households 
on a weekly basis, resulting in an approximately equal 
amount of physical custody in each household. 
[*P11] Father appeals from the trial court's order 
allowing Thanos to intervene, its grant of summary 
judgment to Thanos on the issue of Z.P.'s paternity, and 
its custody determinations to the extent that they relied 
on Thanos's paternity, and Father's non-paternity, of Z.P. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[*P12] Father raises multiple issues on appeal, but 
our decision rests on the question of Thanos's standing to 
challenge Z.P.'s paternity. Generally, a person's standing 
to request particular relief presents a question of law. See 
Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 
2003 UT 58, P18, 82 P.3d 1125. To the extent that 
factual findings inform the issue of standing, '"we review 
such factual determinations made by a trial court with 
deference.'" Id. (quoting Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. 
Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997)). [***8] 
'"Because of the important policy considerations 
involved in granting or denying standing, we closely 
review trial court determinations of whether a given set 
of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, granting 
minimal discretion to the trial court.'" Id. (quoting 
Kearns-Tribune Corp., 946 P.2d at 374). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Schoolcraft Test 
[*P13] The trial court determined that, as of 
November 2002, Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s paternity 
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would not affect the stability of the Pearsons' failed 
marriage and would not constitute a disruptive and 
unnecessary attack [**176] on Z.P.'s paternity. See In 
re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, the 
trial court found that Thanos had standing to challenge 
Z.P.'s paternity under the Schoolcraft test. 
[*P14] While we do not necessarily disagree with 
the trial court's factual findings regarding the evolution 
of the relationships between Z.P. and the various parties, 
we determine that Thanos wholly lacked Schoolcraft 
standing for a substantial period of time prior to his 
establishment of a relationship with Z.P. Even with the 
breakup of the Pearsons' marriage and the development 
[***9] of a relationship between Z.P. and Thanos, we 
cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that Thanos 
satisfied the Schoolcraft test by November 2002. See id. 
at 713. Accordingly, we determine that the trial court 
erred in allowing Thanos to intervene in this action. 
A. Preservation of the Stability of Marriage 
[*P15] The trial court found that "the first prong of 
the Schoolcraft analysis-relating to preserving the 
stability of the marriage-was not a consideration in this 
case, due to the fact that there was no marriage between 
[Father] and [Mother] to be preserved." Although we 
recognize that a divorce terminates any particular 
marriage and leaves nothing to preserve, we still disagree 
with the trial court's assumption that the first Schoolcraft 
prong loses all relevance upon divorce. Rather, we 
review the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether a particular paternity challenge conflicts with the 
policy goal of preserving the stability of the marriage. 
[*P16] The trial court apparently relied on In re 
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), to reach its finding 
that preservation of marriage becomes moot upon 
[***10] the divorce or separation of the parties. In that 
case, Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft were married in 
1984 and lived together for approximately eight months 
before Linda left Winfield. See id. at 712. In November 
1985, some seven months to a year after the parties 
separated, Linda gave birth to J.W.F. Linda abandoned 
J.W.F. shortly thereafter, and the State initiated 
abandonment proceedings in December 1985. Upon 
learning of the child's birth and the abandonment 
proceedings in August 1986, Winfield filed a petition for 
custody of J.W.F., arguing that he was married to Linda 
and living with her at the time of conception. At this 
time, the parties had still not obtained a formal divorce. 
See id. 
[*P17] The standing issue in In re J.W.F. was 
whether a guardian ad litem could challenge Winfield's 
custody petition and presumed paternity of J.W.F. The 
supreme court noted that "the class of persons permitted 
to challenge the presumption of paternity should be 
limited." Id. at 713. The court then identified two 
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"paramount considerations" that must guide standing 
decisions in this context: "preserving the stability of the 
marriage and protecting [***H] children from 
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity." 
Id. "Whether individuals can challenge the presumption 
of legitimacy should depend not on their legal status 
alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether the 
above-stated policies would be undermined by permitting 
the challenge." Id. 
[*P18] In In re J.W.F., the parties' long separation 
prior to the birth of J.W.F. led the supreme court to 
conclude that "the stability of the marriage between 
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft was shaken long ago, 
and their marriage is one in name only." Id. The supreme 
court permitted a challenge to Winfield's paternity in 
these circumstances, deeming it "not inconsistent" with 
the stated policy of preserving the stability of the 
marriage. Id. Notably, each of the three cases cited in 
Schoolcraft in support of this conclusion also involved 
situations where divorce or separation occurred prior to 
or nearly concurrent with the birth of the child. See Teece 
v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 106 (Utah 1986) ("In May of 
1981, plaintiff gave birth to a child. Soon thereafter, she 
filed this action for divorce."); Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 
640, 641 (Utah 1982) [***12] (addressing first 
husband's attempt to deny paternity where child was 
conceived during his marriage but born into a subsequent 
marriage between mother and another man); Lopes v. 
Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974) 
(addressing paternity question when child was yet "to be 
[**177] born" at the time divorce pleadings were filed). 
[*P19] By contrast, the Pearsons made substantial 
efforts to maintain their marriage even though both 
parties knew midway through Z.P.'s gestation that 
Thanos was the likely biological father. The Pearsons 
disagree about their intent regarding Father's relationship 
to Z.P. Father contends that both he and Mother agreed 
that Father would raise Z.P. as his child in all respects, 
while Mother asserts only that she agreed to stay and try 
to make the marriage work so long as Father would not 
punish her or Z.P. for her infidelity. The trial court made 
no findings on the issue, but did find that the Pearsons 
did not separate until Z.P. was approximately nine 
months old. 
[*P20] While not dispositive of Thanos's standing, 
we determine that the Pearsons' efforts to maintain their 
marriage after Z.P.'s birth remain relevant to the 
Schoolcraft [***13] analysis, even post-divorce. The 
question is not whether the Pearsons' marriage ultimately 
failed, but rather whether the potential of a challenge to 
Z.P.'s paternity would have undermined the Pearsons' 
marriage while it was still in existence. n4 Under Father's 
version of events, the possibility of raising Z.P. as his 
own child without interference from Thanos was perhaps 
the central issue motivating him to make the marriage 
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work. While Mother's version is substantially different, 
even her recollection indicates the importance of the 
issue to Father, and her own willingness to make the 
marriage work. 
n4 We note that Thanos's paternity challenge 
arose entirely within the duration of the Pearsons' 
marriage, and that Thanos filed his motion to 
intervene concurrently with Mother's responsive 
pleading in the Pearsons' divorce case, prior to 
the actual decree of divorce. 
[*P21] In any event, the Pearsons stayed together 
in marriage for over a year after Father first became 
aware of Thanos's paternity of Z.P. [***14] The trial 
court erred in failing to recognize that the Pearsons' 
shared parentage of Z.P. represented a stabilizing force in 
their then-existing marriage, and that the potential of a 
paternity challenge would diminish that stabilizing effect. 
Thus, even after the Pearsons filed for divorce, Thanos's 
challenge to Z.P.'s paternity can be said to have had some 
undermining effect on the stability of the Pearsons' 
marriage within the meaning of Schoolcraft's public 
policy analysis. n5 While the reality of the Pearsons' 
ultimate divorce may minimize the importance of the 
first Schoolcraft prong, we cannot say on the facts of this 
case that it obviates that prong altogether. 
N5 We note that the public policy in favor of 
preserving the stability of marriage, always strong 
in Utah, may be even stronger in light of Utah's 
enshrinement of so-called traditional marriage 
into its constitution in 2004. See Utah Const, art. 
I, § 29 (Supp. 2005); but see Citizens for Equal 
Prot v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 
2005) (declaring a similar state constitutional 
amendment invalid on various grounds including 
free association and equal protection). 
r***j^i 
B. Protection of Children from Attacks on Paternity 
[*P22] The second, and in this case more 
problematic, policy consideration under the Schoolcraft 
test is "protecting children from disruptive and 
unnecessary attacks upon their paternity." In re J.W.F., 
799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990). There are crucial 
distinctions between the Pearsons' case and In re J. W.F. 
that lead us to conclude that Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s 
paternity is both disruptive and unnecessary. 
[*P23] In In re J.W.F., J.W.F. was promptly 
abandoned by his mother at birth, his natural father 
apparently never sought or enjoyed any parental role 
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whatsoever, and his mother's husband, Winfield, never 
had custody of J.W.F. or a relationship with him. See id. 
at 712-13. J.W.F. was a little more than one year old at 
the time of the initial standing dispute. Not surprisingly, 
the supreme court had no trouble in determining that 
allowing J.W.F.'s guardian ad litem standing to litigate 
his paternity would not constitute an "unnecessary and 
disruptive attack[]" on J.W.F.'s paternity. Id. at 713. The 
court stated that "J.W.F.'s expectations as to who his 
[***16] father is cannot be shaken by permitting a 
challenge to the presumption of legitimacy. The child has 
never had a relationship with [Winfield] Schoolcraft, [or 
his biological father], [**178] or even his mother, so he 
has no expectations as to who his father is." Id. 
[*P24] Clearly, the present case does not involve a 
lack of paternal relationships. Rather, the trial court was 
presented with an undisputed and ongoing paternal 
relationship between Father and Z.P., as well as Thanos's 
evolving relationship with Z.P. as a stepfather, and as the 
father of one of Z.P.'s siblings. In its November 2002 
order granting Thanos's motion to intervene, the trial 
court explained its ultimate rationale on the unnecessary 
and disruptive prong: 
The court cannot find that granting 
Mr. Thanos the standing to intervene 
would be disruptive to [Z.P.] or an 
unnecessary attack on his paternity. In this 
case, as indicated by Dr. Sanders in her 
report, Mr. Thanos has an established 
relationship with the child and there is 
nothing in the reports of Dr. Sanders that 
would suggest allowing Mr. Thanos to 
intervene would be adverse to the best 
interests of the child. The report of Dr. 
Sanders, to the [***n] contrary, 
indicates that it is in the best interests of 
the child to allow Mr. Thanos to 
intervene. n6 
The November order also recognized that Father had 
"functioned as Z.P.'s father since his birth." 
n6 Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002 report 
concluded that "from a developmental and 
psychological perspective, [Z.P.]'s functioning is 
not inherently disrupted by [Thanos's] 
involvement and [Thanos's] relationship with 
[Z.P.] is necessary to [Z.P.]'s normal and positive 
development." Dr. Sanders's supplemental report 
of August 26, 2002, further concluded that "there 
is no reason to believe that further disruption to 
the relationship between [Z.P.] and [Father] is 
intrinsically linked to Mr. Thanos'[s] presence in 
[Z.P.]'s life." 
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Mere involvement or presence in a child's 
life is a very different thing than a legal challenge 
to the child's paternity. Thus, we do not see Dr. 
Sanders's reports as being responsive to the 
Schoolcraft goal of "protecting [Z.P.] from 
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon [his] 
paternity." In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 713 
(emphasis added). 
[***18] 
[*P25] We have no reason to question the trial 
court's findings as they relate to the contents of Dr. 
Sanders's report or the existence of some relationship 
between Thanos and Z.P. in November 2002. However, 
despite the paternal role that Thanos may eventually have 
attempted to take, the undisputed facts of the case are 
that Thanos had little interest or involvement in Z.P.'s life 
until he was approximately sixteen months of age. The 
trial court recognized as much in its October 2001 order 
initially denying Thanos's motion to intervene: "Mr. 
Thanos was completely absent from [Z.P.'s] first year of 
life, was absent for the first half of his second year of 
life, and has had incidental contact during the second half 
of the second year of [Z.P.'s] life." As a result of this 
intentional absence, Z.P. developed a paternal 
relationship exclusively with Father over the first two 
years of his life, a relationship that both Father and Z.P. 
apparently continue to foster to the present. 
[*P26] The Schoolcraft analysis is not intended to 
protect children from all attacks on their paternity, but 
only those that are disruptive and unnecessary. See id. In 
evaluating the disruptiveness [***19] of a paternity 
challenge, the supreme court focused on the child's 
relationship with the existing father figure and the child's 
"expectations as to who his father is." Id. Here, the trial 
court found in its October 2001 order that Father was the 
"psychological father of [Z.P.]," that Z.P. had "become 
closely bonded with [Father]," and that those bonds were 
"critical." The trial court further found as a factual matter 
that to permit Thanos "to establish his paternity of [Z.P.] 
and to be introduced at this point as a father figure in 
[Z.P.'s] life would be immediately disruptive to the 
child's stability." These facts leave little doubt that, at 
least as of October 2001, Thanos's paternity challenge 
would have been disruptive to Z.P.'s existing paternal 
relationship with Father and Z.P.'s expectations as to who 
his father was. 
[*P27] We see nothing in the record to indicate that 
the mere passage of time, or the integration of Thanos 
into Z.P.'s life as Mother's husband, destroyed or even 
diminished Z.P.'s paternal relationship with Father or his 
expectations as to who his father was. To the contrary, 
Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002 report found that "[Z.P.] 
identifies [Father] [***20] as his father and their 
attachment is secure, strong and healthy." Her 
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supplemental report [**179] of August 26, 2002 
confirmed that Z.P. and Father shared a "strong and 
positive parent-child attachment." Despite Dr. Sanders's 
other conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best interests, n7 her 
findings of a continuing paternal relationship between 
Z.P. and Father should have been the central focus of the 
trial court's Schoolcraft analysis. 
n7 We are aware that disregarding Dr. 
Sanders's conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best 
interests seems counterintuitive given the central 
role that the best interests standard plays in every 
case involving juveniles. Nevertheless, in the 
context of determining standing to contest 
paternity, the Schoolcraft test is the standard set 
by the supreme court to measure the child's best 
interests as those interests balance against the 
rights of others. 
[*P28] In light of those findings, we cannot say that 
Thanos's attack on Z.P.'s paternity would not have been 
disruptive to Z.P.'s paternal [***21] relationship with 
Father and his expectations about whom his father was. 
The entire motivation for Thanos's attempt to intervene 
was to establish that he, rather than Father, was to fulfill 
the paternal role in Z.P.'s life. Whatever other effects 
Thanos's challenge might ultimately have on Z.P., his 
direct attack on Father's paternity of Z.P. certainly fails 
the Schoolcraft directive of avoiding disruption of 
existing paternal relationships. 
[*P29] We must also examine whether Thanos's 
paternity challenge can be deemed "necessary." Id. In re 
J.W.F. did not provide guidance on distinguishing 
between necessary and unnecessary paternity challenges, 
and the trial court did not expressly address the issue. We 
presume that, like the disruption element, the necessity 
element must be analyzed primarily from the child's 
perspective rather than from Father's or Thanos's. See id. 
(emphasizing a policy of "protecting children" and 
analyzing disruption from the child's perspective). We 
also assume, without deciding, that Schoolcraft standing 
always exists at birth and can be lost only thereafter. Cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78- 30-4.14(2) (2002) (establishing 
standards by [***22] which unmarried biological father 
can establish paternity so as to defeat adoption of his 
child by another at birth). 
[*P30] Proceeding under these assumptions, we 
cannot see how Thanos's ability to challenge Z.P.'s 
paternity remained necessary after he voluntarily 
absented himself from Z.P.'s life. From Z.P.'s 
perspective, he had a father in Father from his earliest 
ability to form paternal bonds. Had the Pearson marriage 
succeeded, Father would likely have remained Z.P.'s 
father in all regards throughout the foreseeable future. 
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Dr. Sanders found that, even when the Pearsons' 
marriage failed, Z.P. continued to identify Father as his 
father and enjoy a strong paternal relationship with him. 
Thus, at the time of the trial court's intervention order, 
Z.P. had a father and was not in need of a different one. 
[*P31] We need not determine the exact point at 
which Thanos's paternity challenge became unnecessary 
for Schoolcraft purposes. It is sufficient in this case to 
determine that there existed a period of many months 
during which Z.P. developed a strong paternal 
relationship with a loving and willing presumed father. 
So long as that relationship continues, it cannot be 
[***23] said for Schoolcraft purposes that Z.P. has any 
particular need for his paternity to be established in 
another man. n8 
n8 This is not inconsistent with Dr. Sanders's 
assessment that Thanos has a potentially valuable 
role to play in Z.P.'s life. That role, however, 
need not be as the primary father figure. 
[*P32] Looking at the circumstances of this case as 
a whole, we conclude that the trial court should have 
deemed Thanos's attack on Z.P.'s paternity both 
disruptive and unnecessary. Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s 
presumed paternity became disruptive and unnecessary 
when he allowed Z.P. to form paternal bonds with 
Father, and will likely remain so, for Schoolcraft 
purposes, as long as those bonds continue. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Thanos to 
Intervene 
[*P33] In light of our conclusions regarding the 
application of the Schoolcraft factors to this case, we 
determine that Thanos lacks standing to challenge Z.P.'s 
paternity and that the trial court erred by allowing him to 
intervene [***24] in the Pearsons' divorce action. 
[**180] While the Pearsons' marriage may be long 
dissolved, we must give some weight to the fact that the 
Pearsons attempted to save their marriage, and that 
Father's intent and ability to raise Z.P. as his own were 
significant factors in that decision. Most significantly, 
however, an attack on Z.P.'s paternity at this point would 
be disruptive of Z.P.'s strong paternal relationship with 
Father, a relationship that renders Thanos's challenge 
unnecessary from Z.P.'s perspective. Under these 
circumstances, Thanos does not have Schoolcraft 
standing, and the trial court erred in allowing him to 
intervene. 
[*P34] We analogize Thanos's status to that of an 
unmarried father seeking to establish parental rights to 
his child in the face of the mother's intent to have the 
child adopted. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2). 
Section 78-30-4.14(2) sets out various requirements that 
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an unmarried biological father n9 must comply with in 
order to establish his paternity. See id. When the 
adoption involves a child under six months of age, 
section 78-30- 4.14(2) establishes specific acts, including 
initiating a paternity action, [***25] that the father must 
take prior to the mother executing her consent to the 
adoption. See id. § 78-30- 4.14(2)(b). The mother's 
consent to adoption can be executed as little as twenty-
four hours after the child's birth. See id. § 78-30-4.19 
(2002). A father who fails to comply with the 
requirements of section 78-30-4.14(2) has no standing to 
object to the adoption and permanently loses his parental 
rights to the child. See id. § 78-30-4.14(5); In re 
adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, PP10-12, 984 P.2d 967 
("Under Utah law, 'an unmarried biological father has an 
inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection 
only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during 
pregnancy and upon the child's birth.'" (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e) (1996)). 
n9 "Unmarried biological father" for 
purposes of Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(2) 
means a man not married to the child's mother, 
without regard to whether the man is married to 
another. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.11 
(2002) (repealed 2005) (defining "unmarried 
biological father"); id. § 78-30-1.1(5) (Supp. 
2005) (same). 
[***26] 
[*P35] By holding Thanos to a similar, if 
somewhat more generous, standard, we recognize that a 
husband is presumed to be the legal father of a child born 
into his marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2(2) 
(Supp. 2005). In the vast majority of marital births, the 
husband is also the natural, biological father of the child. 
However, in the hopefully rare instance where a child 
born into a marriage is fathered by another man, the 
husband is nevertheless deemed the father of the child, 
with all concomitant rights and responsibilities, unless 
and until his paternity is successfully challenged under 
the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. See id. § § 78-45g-101 
to -902 (Supp. 2005); id. § 30-1-17.2(4) ("A 
presumption of paternity established under this section 
may only be rebutted in accordance with Section 78-45g-
607.n). Essentially, an illegitimate child born into a 
marriage is immediately subject to a de facto adoption by 
the mother's husband. We see no reason why a man who 
chooses to procreate with the wife of another should be 
granted significant latitude to challenge the husband's de 
facto adoption, while one who fails to timely establish 
his [***27] paternity of a child born to an unmarried 
woman is permanently barred from doing so upon the 
mother's mere consent to the child's adoption. 
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[*P36] Like any other unmarried father who fails to 
perfect his inchoate parental rights, Thanos lost his 
standing to contest Z.P.'s paternity sometime during the 
early months of Z.P.'s life. Despite the evolving 
circumstances of this case, we conclude that since that 
time Thanos has not met, and to our knowledge still does 
not meet, the Schoolcraft factors. nlO Accordingly, the 
trial court erred in granting Thanos's January 2001 
motion to intervene and his subsequent motion for 
summary judgment establishing his paternity of Z.P. 
nlO We express no opinion on the separate 
question of whether Schoolcraft standing, once 
lost, can ever be regained due to changed 
circumstances. 
II. Z.P.'s Paternity and Custody 
[*P37] Our determination that it was error to allow 
Thanos to intervene in the Pearsons' [**I81] divorce 
action has inescapable consequences for the trial court's 
[***28] paternity and custody orders. With Thanos 
improperly joined in this litigation, the trial court's 
consideration of Thanos's motion for summary judgment 
to establish paternity, and the genetic evidence in support 
thereof, was error. And, of course, the court's May 2003 
order granting Thanos's summary judgment on the issue 
of his fatherhood of Z.P. was also erroneous and is 
reversed. 
[*P38] With Thanos and all of his various 
pleadings and evidence out of the litigation, Father 
remains the presumed and legal father of Z.P. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2(2). Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in applying the parental presumption in favor of 
Mother nil and against Father in making its ultimate 
custody decision regarding Z.P. Other aspects of the trial 
court's supplemental decree of divorce also rely, 
explicitly or implicitly, on Thanos's paternity of Z.P., and 
these aspects of the final order are also erroneous and 
must be revisited as appropriate. 
nil We recognize that Mother asserted 
Father's non-paternity of Z.P. in her answer and 
in a simultaneous motion to show cause, and that 
she could have litigated Z.P.'s paternity on 
identical evidence in Thanos's absence. 
Regardless of this possibility, Z.P.'s paternity was 
actually litigated almost exclusively between 
Father and Thanos, an improper party. We rule 
today solely on the issues before us, and neither 
Mother nor Thanos argue on appeal that Mother's 
pleadings provide an independent ground to 
affirm the trial court's paternity finding. 
More importantly, for all of the reasons set 
forth in this opinion, Mother would also appear to 
be barred from challenging Z.P.'s paternity on the 
facts and posture of this case. She too would lack 
Schoolcraft standing, see In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 
710, 713 (Utah 1990), and her actions prior to the 
initiation of divorce proceedings might support a 
determination that her challenge was barred by 
equitable estoppel. See Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 
2004 UT App 391.P14, 101 R3d 830 (listing 
elements of equitable estoppel); see also Kristen 
D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717, 719 N.Y.SJd 
771, 772-73 (App. Div. 2001) ("Courts have long 
recognized the availability of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity 
proceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v. 
Roberta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812, 658 N.Y.SJd 506 
(App. Div. 1997) (applying equitable estoppel 
principles to bar a paternity challenge). For the 
same reasons, Father would also appear to be 
barred from seeking to disestablish paternity of 
Z.P. should he ever choose to do so. 
We express no opinion on whether Z.P. 
himself, the state of Utah, or any other person or 
entity could ever challenge Father's paternity, or 
the circumstances that might permit such a 
challenge. 
[***29] 
[*P39] We reverse the trial court's orders below to 
the extent that they rely on Thanos's paternity of Z.P., 
and remand this matter to the trial court for the issuance 
of a new custody order, taking into account Father's legal 
paternity of Z.P. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P40] Thanos should not have been allowed to 
intervene in this matter due to a lack of Schoolcraft 
standing. Accordingly, the presumption of Father's 
legitimate parentage of Z.P. remains unrebutted, and 
Father remains the legal parent of Z.P. The trial court's 
supplemental decree of divorce, as well as any other 
order entered below, is reversed to the extent that it 
conflicts with Father's legal status as Z.P.'s parent or was 
premised on Thanos's paternity. This matter is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
[*P41] WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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